I am one of the few people I know who was not surprised by the fall of Kabul and the chaotic US evacuation. Americans aren’t known for their interest in foreign policy, and Afghanistan was a media low-priority for the last ten years. The Iraq invasion, WMD, three changes of presidents, hurricanes, two impeachments and a deadly virus distracted attention from a war in Afghanistan that had disappeared into background noise.
However, the dots were there. Because they came out in fragments over twenty-four months, they may have been harder to connect. Looking at them together, however, they point to the only conclusion: the unruly Kabul evacuation was the last, inevitable - maybe even ‘fitting’ - event in 19 1/2 years of failed strategy. Although Bin Laden was not assassinated until 2O11, he was driven from Afghanistan, Al Queda was routed and the Taliban tried to surrender to the US by December 2OO1.
Mission accomplished? Central Command wasn’t sure. The architects of the war doubled down on the flawed Bush strategy to topple governments and remake the Middle East after 9/11. While still not sure what ‘victory’ in Afghanistan would mean, the Bush Administration invaded Iraq. No operational finesse, no schools built, no tactical victories would change the course of these wars. Mission creep took over and strategy morphed into expedient justifications of experiments in nation-building.
Bombs kept exploding, villages were destroyed, Afghan troops and civilians killed by the thousands. The failures of the General Command and political leaders to even cut their losses was incomprehensible.
First and foremost, they pulled a deceitful ‘bait and switch’ on the American people. What was supposed to be a limited intervention became the longest war in the country’s history. How this happened after the negative lessons of Vietnam - and with an Iraqi insurgency against US interventions taking place simultaneously - is the central question for which the nation needs answers.
Second, the Military consistently overestimated the strength of the US/allied forces and underestimated the enemy’s prowess. Even after the 2O11 ‘surge’ - based on the “Petraeus/Crocker” model in Iraq - reporters on the ground revealed that the number of trained Iraqi soldiers was a fraction of what the Pentagon claimed to Congress. “If only we had….more troops…more time… more money…better technology…”, the Afghanis “can take over in - how many? - years.”
After two decades of training Afghan soldiers to protect their own country, Central Command claimed it hadn’t realized how quickly the Afghan forces would melt away in direct confrontation with the Taliban. Some Afghan soldiers hadn’t been paid in months, and in rural areas, they and civilians had to decide which was worse: American bombs and night raids or Taliban rule.
Third, the corruption of US supported Afghan governments and army commanders left no doubt the US presence in Afghanistan continued on shaky ground. Flouting their anti-corruption bona fides while downplaying their harsh reputation, the Taliban won over rural merchants, farmers and craftsmen whose livelihood was threatened by war.
Finally, even if Afghani civilians, soldiers, NGOs, foreign armies, the diplomatic corps and reporters didn’t quite understand the gravity of the situation, President Trump’s pact with the Taliban in February2O2O should have signaled a messy end to the war was coming. After pledging to work with the Afghanistan government in political negotiations with the Taliban, Trump turned around and negotiated a devil’s appeasement with Taliban leaders instead. Trump promised American troop withdrawal by May 2O21 in return for the Taliban ceasing attacks on Americans troops in the interim. In the first 1OO days, American troop strength dropped from 14,OOO down to 8,OOO and bases began to be mothballed. This was well before Biden took over.
True to their word, the Taliban stood by the Trump agreement for eighteen months. Instead of attacking Americans, however, they were now free to trained their fire and suicide detonators on the Afghan Army and civilians.
Reading between the lines you’d have to be blind not to see unraveling and panic unfolding as the finalé of a dizzying war. Those who are screaming the loudest about the failed evacuation are the ones who got us into war in the first place. Bush. Cheney. Petraeus. Max Boot. Bill Krystol. And. Many. Others. They are the ones with the moral obligation to answer for the failure in Afghanistan. If they aren’t held responsible and debriefed before the American people, history will repeat itself - again.
Precisely - the duh factor to incompetent handling of this. Has no one been reading Jon Lee Anderson, Robert Kaplan, Sebastian Junger, among others? What has been lost by this bungling by all - will bite the Dems in the voter booth 2022, and god help us - 2024. Keep at it RBTL!